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In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among 
heterogeneous users. The agent’s payoff is the weighted sum of the users’ shares and the 
coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users’ heterogeneity the 
game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non- 
egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by 
delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer 
(but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. 
Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.  
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In any classroom, each teacher or professor is bound to wonder whether she 
should make more effort toward the most able, more effort toward the least 
able, or to teach without any consideration about the specific characteristics 
of her pupils. In the first case, the teacher wishes to value at best her 
individual effort (the most able, the most valuable). At the opposite, the 
teacher wishes to reduce unequal abilities among pupils. In the last case, 
the teacher delivers a anonymous course to pupils (the course is not based 
on the distribution of ability among pupils). 
 
Such a concern is more generally inherent to any form of public service, 
since each user must be equal (i.e. anonymous) in front of the civil servant. 
Apart from the example of the teacher (civil servant) and her pupils (users), 
regarding other public services, users’ heterogeneity may lie in any other 
individual characteristics interfering in the co-production of the service. 
 
The way by which the teacher delivers a course deeply depends on the level 
of the costly effort oriented toward pupils. It is doubtful that the teacher will 
choose her effort level independently of her opinion regarding the anonymity 
principle. As the effort also depends on the compensation scheme including 
or not incentives, this paper deals with the reliability of the anonymity 
principle  to the power of incentives. 
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For Laffont (1999), the French public service system is characterized by the 
absence of monetary incentives and sanctions, a permanent relying on the 
benevolence of civil servants and an independence between wage variability 
and  performance. In particular, with an almost fixed wage, there are no 
incentives to take into account users’ heterogeneity, especially if there little 
or no concern about joint production maximization between users and civil 
servants.  
 
However, introducing incentives into any form of organization is not always 
the best way to induce the highest effort from agent or to maximize the 
value of the outcome. The motivation crowding theory explores the 
psychological effects of monetary rewards and effort. Deci and Ryan (1985) 
showed that where individuals perceive an external intervention to be 
controlling, their intrinsic motivation to perform the task diminish. 
Introducing such kind of considerations within principal-agent models then 
induces a classical perverse effect of incentives on motivation, highlighted as 
a motivation crowding-out effect (see among others Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2004; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). This hidden 
costs of incentives induces a trade-off between motivation and incentives but 
as pointed out by Akerlof and Kranton (2003), a source of motivation is 
missing from current models of organization.  Akerlof and Kranton 
characterize this missing source as identity, that is a person’s self image. 
And interestingly, they indicate that “In the Army as well as in civilian organizations, such identification – or lack of it – plays a critical role in the 
determination of work effort, incentive schemes, and organizational design”. 
 
Besides, as highlighted by Dixit (2002), it is conventional wisdom to 
attribute many perceived ills of public sector services, like high costs for 
poor quality of products or lack of attention to users, to the absence of 
competition and consequent weakness of incentives. In such a context, civil 
servants are usually assimilated to pencil pushers who deliver an equally 
low service toward anonymous users. 
 
However, in the public as well as in the private sector, the power of 
incentives and competition cannot be considered in isolation to ethical 
considerations. In particular, using the examples of "excessive" executive 
pay, corporate earnings manipulation, and commercial activities by 
universities, Shleifer (2004) shows that when unethical behavior cuts costs, 
competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs' incomes, and thereby 
reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct. Competition then 
induces a crowding-out effect on the ethical behavioral of agents.  In the 
long run however, competition may induce crowding in effects on ethical 
behaviors because it promotes growth and raises incomes, and higher 
incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior, but may also 
change what people believe to be ethical for the better. 
 
  - 4 -Our paper contributes to this debate on crowding effects and incentives by 
considering a principal agent user model in which if the agent makes a high 
level of effort and selects or ranks users,  we can establish that incentives 
induce a crowding out effect on users. 
 
More precisely, we consider a principal agent user model in which agents 
make a two-step decision: the production of an outcome by a costly effort 
and the distribution of this outcome among heterogeneous individual users. 
In the first step, we allow for two possibilities : the principal can reward the 
agent either by a fixed wage or by a performance based compensation. In the 
second step, the agent allocates the outcome among users in order to co 
produce with them. The reward of the agent depends positively on the global 
value of this joint production and negatively on the dispersion of the 
distribution of the outcome among users.  
 
The larger the size of the outcome obtained by an individual performance 
based compensation, the greater the level of inequality among users. By 
contrast, the low outcome resulting from a fixed wage incites the agent to 
offer an anonymous allocation among users; that is behave like a pencil 
pusher. We therefore obtain an endogenous relationship between incentives 
for the agents and crowding effects toward users, thereby departing from 
the classical trade-off between incentives versus motivation crowding-out for 
the agents. 
 
  - 5 -This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model 
of the Pencil-Pusher Game. Section 3 presents the main results of the 
model. Section 4 develops some calibration exercises carried out to illustrate 
the results and discusses the relationship between incentives and crowding 
effects. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Pencil-Pusher Game  
 
Our game-theoretic model involves three kinds of players: a principal, a 
group of agents i 1,...,n =  who make decisions either independently from one 
another or within a team, and a group of users  1,..., j m = , where 
  The game is a two-stage game : a first stage between the 
principal and each agent or the team of agents; and a second stage between 
each agent and the users. 
1, 1. nm >>
 
The payoff of each agent corresponds to the sum of the payment obtained in 
each stage of the game,   in the first stage and   in the second stage. 
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2.1. The first stage of the game 
 
During the first stage, we consider a simple agency relationship between a 
principal and n identical agents (with the same utility function). In the most 
simplified form, each agent performs an unobservable effort 
{} ( ) ,0 ii ee ∈
() 0a n d v ′ ′′ ⋅≥
, 1 , at the expense of a disutility ve , where 
. The effort of each agent i generates an observable 
individual outcome 
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The agent’s utility function is of the form  , where 
. The principal is risk neutral and is interested only in 
his expected outcome 
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•  If the principal demands the low effort to agent i  i , it is enough to 
pay her a fixed amount equivalent to the amount she would be paid under 
the assumption of verifiable effort. The principal then offers the agent a 
compensation based on the agent’s reservation utility and on the disutility 
of the low effort. In this case, 
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•  If the principal wishes to obtain from the agent the high level of effort 
( ) 1 i e = , and if we assume that   ( ) , then the 
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2.2. The second stage of the game 
 
The objective of the second stage consists in a co-production between each 
agent and the group of users. Each user j is characterized by a level of 
productivity  j ρ . The agent has to choose a distribution of her outcome   for 
the users ()  (so that 
i a







a ≤ ∑ ). 
The output   of this co-production between the agent i and the users is 








=⋅ ∑ i j a
  - 7 -second stage depends positively on   and negatively on the dispersion  i q i σ  of 
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Such a measure of the dispersion of the distribution represents the agent’s 
disutility of choosing a distribution  )
1... ij jm a
= . Intuitively, what is costly for 
the agent in the second stage is to allocate the first-stage outcome   among 
the users, and the disutility of this allocation is given by the measure of its 
dispersion. In fact, the agent is committed by the labor contract  to deliver a 
collective service as in any public organization.  
i a
 
The definition of   captures the following trade-off. Either the agent 
chooses to deliver an anonymous service (without taking into account the 
users’ heterogeneity in terms of productivity), or she searches to maximize 
the output of the co-production on the basis of the users’ heterogeneity in 
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In turn, the agent determines the equilibrium distribution of the first stage 
outcome ()  according to the following program:  































  - 8 -The first order conditions of this program with respect to   and λ, 
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint write 


















We have a system of m+1 equations, with m+1 unknown variables: λ and 
. After some simple algebra, we finally obtain:  ()
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2.3. The no-corner condition 
 
Two assumptions are made with respect to the equilibrium distribution 
chosen by the agent.  
Assumption 1: The service allocated to users must be positive 
0, 1... ij aj ≥∀ =   (A1) 
 












                                                
  (C1) 
 
Condition (C1) is standard since it simply assumes that public services 
cannot be strictly null for any user.   
 
 
1 There are two ways to solve the program : either the agent considers  i a  as given when choosing her 
allocation distribution among users, or she takes into account the cross-effects among users, that is , 
she does  not take  i a  as given. Both methods yields to the same analytical results. The former is the 
simplest to present, therefore it is the one detailed  in the paper. 
  - 9 -Assumption 2. When the outcome of the first stage of the game   is 
very high, the agent should not allocate the entire outcome to the 
highest productive user.  
i a
 
Let  l ρ  denote the highest level of productivity among users,  l () max j j ρ ρ = , 
and let  l
i a  denote the public service provided by the agent to the highest 
productivity user,  l
i aa = i  for  l ( ) max j j ρ ρ = . A degenerate distribution such 
that  l l and j j 0 i j a 1... such that  m ii aa ρ ρ == ∀ = ≠  is ruled out when the 
outcome of the agent is negative or null. Using equation (1), such an 
assumption writes:  
  l () l ( ) () ( )
22
2 ,0,...,0 0 1 0 ii i i i i i wa a a a a m a ρ =≤ ⇔ ⋅ − − − − ⋅ ≤   (A2) 
 
Assumption (A2) is more restrictive than (A1) since it imposes another 
restriction on the equilibrium allocation of public service, according to which 
inequality of treatment (allocating the entire public service to one user only  
- the highest productive one) is ruled out.  
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assumption (A2), leads to the following condition on the first stage outcome:  
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  - 10 -3. Anonymity Principle within Public Services 
 
Given the equilibrium distribution (equations (3)) and provided that 
condition (C1) holds, the theoretical model leads to the following results, 
depending on whether condition (C2) holds or not. 
 
3.1. Public Service when condition (C2) is satisfied  
 
In this case, the first-stage outcome of the Pencil-Pusher Game is high 
enough for the agent to face a trade-off between the anonymity principle and 
the efficiency of the co-production. We therefore have the following result. 
 
Result 1. Anonymous versus efficient public services. 
 
When condition (C2) is fulfilled and under (C1), the Pencil-Pusher Game 
leads to a unique equilibrium distribution which is egalitarian when the 
minimizing dispersion effect compensates the co-production’s equilibrium 


















−    −
⋅⋅ + > ⋅   
   ∑∑∑ ∑
ρ − 

  	 
  	 

  (4) 
 
 
  - 11 -Proof. 
When (C2) holds, the agent’s payoffs when the distribution of public service 
among users by the agent is either the equilibrium one (equations (3)) or the 
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Result 1 then is obtained after some simple algebra. 
 
 
Result 1 exhibits a trade-off for the agent between two kind of effects: 
 
•  on the one hand, a minimizing dispersion effect  in favor of the 
anonymity principle, that is independently of the nature of the co-
production relationship between the agent and the users, since the 
dispersion is minimized (and null) when users are treated equally, that is 






=∀ = m ;  
 
•  and on the other hand, a co-production efficiency effect inducing 
the agent to take into account users’ productive heterogeneity, since 
maximizing the output of the co-production relationship between the agent 
and the users leads to the maximum efficient outcome, as in any standard 
concave optimization program. 
 
In other words, when the minimizing dispersion effect dominates the co-
production efficiency one, the agent’s behavior is driven by the anonymity 
  - 12 -principle. Otherwise, the equilibrium allocation is driven by the users’ 
heterogeneity. 
 
Let consider now the situation when condition (C2) is not fulfilled, that is, 
when the first-stage outcome is below the threshold level  .   a
 
3.2. Public Service when condition (C2) is violated  
 










In other words, the agent has to allocate a “small service” (which we will call 
a “minimum public service”)   toward users. Besides, we cannot apply the 
standard optimization program to determine the agent’s equilibrium 
distribution’s decision. Indeed, condition (C2) is required for equations (3) to 
be considered as equilibrium distributions. 
i a
 
However, since condition (C2) is violated, the agent may in this case allocate 
the entire outcome to the highest productive user. We therefore have to 
determine whether there exists a unique distribution in this case, or 
whether distributions other than the most unequal one (allocating the entire 
first-stage outcome to the most productive user) exist or not.  
 
In particular, we will compare the unequal distribution with the egalitarian 






=∀ = m , since it is the distribution that minimizes  the 
agent’s disutility (dispersion). 
 
  - 13 -Result 2. Anonymity but minimum public service. 
When condition (C2) does not hold and under (C1), the Pencil-Pusher  Game 


































When (C2) does not hold, the agent’s second-stage rewards when the  
distribution of public service among users is either the unequal one, or the 
egalitarian one ( , 1... i
ij
a aj m =∀ = m ) are such that: 
ll

















ii i i i j i j i i
jj
aa a a a a a
w
mm m m m m m m
aa








  =⋅ − − = ⋅= ⋅ + ∀ ≠  
 
    == ⋅ − −= ⋅ − − − − ⋅    





Therefore, comparing both rewards, results 2 is easily obtained.  
 
Result 2 establishes that when condition (C2) does not hold, the agent faces 
a trade-off exhibiting two kinds of effects: 
 
•  on the one hand, a minimizing dispersion effect  in favor of an 
equality of treatment independently of users’ heterogeneity, that is 
independently of the nature of the co-production relationship between the 
agent and the users, since the dispersion is minimized (and null) when users 







=∀ = m ;  
 
  - 14 -•  and on the other hand, a co-production efficiency effect between 
the agent and the most productive user only, in favor of the most 
inequitable distribution, since violating condition (C2) implies delivering 
a null service to all users except the highest productive one. 
 
When condition (C2) does not hold, the first-stage outcome is so low (below 
the threshold value  ) that the minimizing dispersion effect is always 
dominating, the Pencil-Pusher game then leads to an anonymous allocation. 
In other words, whatever the heterogeneity among users, that is whatever 
the nature of the co-production relationship between the agent and the 
users (even though it may be high), the agent always prefers to deliver an 
anonymous (i.e. egalitarian) public service and does not take into account 
the productivity differentials that may exist within the group of users when 




4. Incentives for agents with crowding-out toward users 
 
An important result in our model is that the larger the size of the outcome 
obtained by an individual performance based compensation, the greater the 
level of inequality among users. By contrast, the small outcome resulting 
from a fixed wage incites the agent to deliver an anonymous service to 
users. We therefore obtain an endogenous relationship between incentives 
for the agents and crowding effects toward users. 
  - 15 -In this section, we provide some calibration exercises to illustrate these 
links between incentives and crowding effects. 
 
4.1. Calibration and simulation results 
 
To calibrate the model, we restrict the number of users to m=3. In this  case, 
















, 3 aj  
Condition (C2) is also given by:  l * 3
2
i a ρ >⋅  
The model is calibrated and simulated 2 considering two alternative cases: a 
low and high  heterogeneity among users.  The parameter values are set as 
follows. 
 
  Low heterogeneity  High heterogeneity  
Users’ ability levels  12 3 18, 24, 30 ρ ρρ ===   12 3 6, 18, 24 ρ ρρ = ==  
Condition (C2) holds  [ ]
* 45,100 i a ∈   [ ]
* 36,100 i a ∈  
Condition (C2) does not 
hold 
[ ]
* 1, 44 i a ∈   [ ]
* 1,35 i a ∈  
 
In the four cases considered (low and high heterogeneity among users and 
(C2) holds or does not hold), the dashed line represents the equilibrium 
dispersion  function whereas the  solid line represents the equilibrium  co-
production function.  
 
                                                 
2 The model has been calibrated using the Mathematica 4.0 software. Programs are 
available upon request. 








Figure 1: Low heterogeneity among users, (C2) holds 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that when heterogeneity among users is low, the 
dispersion function is increasing in a  and always above the co-production 
function. Hence, for low levels of heterogeneity among users, result 1 holds,  
that is, the agent prefers to treat users anonymously, that is without taking 
into account their heterogeneity in terms of productivity, whatever the value 




In other words, when users are weakly heterogeneous, the minimizing 
dispersion effect in favor of an equality of treatment independently of users’ 
heterogeneity dominates the co-production efficiency effect (which would 
induce the agent to take into account users’ productive heterogeneity). 
This suggests that when (C2) holds, low levels of heterogeneity among 
users, independently of the level of   (but below  ), always favors the 
anonymity principle. 
i a  a
 







Figure 2: High heterogeneity among users, (C2) holds 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the trade-off between the minimizing dispersion effect in 
favor of an equality of treatment independently of users’ heterogeneity and  
the co-production efficiency effect inducing the agent to take into account 
users’ productive heterogeneity depends on the level of  .  i a
 
Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate result 2, that is the anonymous minimum 
public service effect. Indeed, when condition (C2) is violated, this effect 
always holds whatever the level of heterogeneity among users, a result 
indeed exhibited by our simulations when    is low ( i a  * 45 i aa ≤=  for low 
heterogeneity among users and   * 36 i aa ≤ =  for a high heterogeneity among 
users), the most inequitable distribution (delivering all the public service to 
the highest productive user) is never an equilibrium outcome: the 
equilibrium dispersion function is always below the equilibrium co-
production function. 
 
4.2. At which level does the crowding-out effect occurs? 
 
We have shown that the nature of incentives offered to agents (fixed versus 
performance based pay) influences their egalitarian behavior toward users. 
  - 18 -This effect induces a positive link between incentives at the agents’ level 
and motivation crowding-out effects toward users.  
 
Hence, where the standard literature finds crowding-out effects among 
agents, we provide a theoretical model with a three-layer hierarchy 
(principal agent user) where incentives are associated with crowding-out 
effects among users.  
 
In other words, what we show is that incentives-based pay induces a second 
order incentive to break users’ anonymity. When users’ heterogeneity is 
taken into account, crowding-out indeed increases : the agent’s performance 
affects positively differences among users.  
 
A low performing agent, like a Pencil-Pusher, in the first stage of the game 
chooses to reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian 
service. On the contrary, an intermediate or a high performing agent tends 
to prefer but not always, delivering an unequal service.  
 
5. Conclusion.  
 
The principal-agents-users model considered in this paper, the Pencil-
Pusher  Game, shows that compensation schemes affects agents’ egalitarian 
behaviors within public organizations. We show that there exists a trade-off 
for the agent between the anonymity principle and the efficiency of the co-
production. When the former dominates the latter, the Pencil-Pusher  game 
  - 19 -leads to an egalitarian outcome. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution 
contradicts the anonymity principle, thereby inducing crowding out effects 
from agents toward users. 
 
The agent’s performance in the first stage affects inequality in the 
distribution of users’ ability. A low performing agent, like a Pencil-Pusher, 
chooses to reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian 
service. On the contrary, an intermediate or a high performing agent tends 
to prefer but not always, delivering an unequal service. In other words, 
incentives do matter not only regarding the agents behavior but also 
regarding the egalitarian nature,  of the public service delivered. Therefore 
we characterize an endogenous link between incentives and crowding effect 
toward users. 
 
Since the power of incentives and competition cannot be considered in 
isolation to ethical considerations, as pointed out by Shleifer (2004), our 
model suggests a more general interpretation of the relationship between 
incentives and crowding effects. Indeed, in our model, the relationship 
between the agent and the users can be viewed as specific dictator game 
with two variants : first, the agent –the dictator- chooses an allocation of a 
pie between heterogeneous responders – the users; and second, the 
dictator’s payoff is defined as the weighted sum of the individual shares 
among users by the coefficient reflecting the heterogeneity of the 
responders. The literature on dictator games and their experimental 
  - 20 -applications constitute a fruitful area of application for our theoretical 
model. 
 
We will therefore test our theoretical predictions by running experiments, in 
particular to determine to which extent the link between incentives for the 
agents and an crowding effects toward users suggest that incentive labor 
contracts within public organizations need a preliminary sorting among 
users in order to induce performance and reduce crowding-out effects on 
users. 
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